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Abstract
We investigate, considering disposal and recycling activities after the consump-
tion of products, the models that explicitly incorporate both the product market and
the recycling market. In the field, the deposit-refund (D-R) policy has been discussed
as an ideal policy to internalize disposal cost, which can result in the realization of
the first-best policy. However, the possibility of firms’ illegal disposal has been ne-
glected. We introduce monitoring cost to prevent firms from disposing of collected
residuals illegally and induce the second-best D-R policy. We find that the monitoring
problem for firms brings about a variety in the optimal level of the refunds (which is
typically be smaller than the first best level). Furthermore, we investigate an alterna-
tive policy that requires producers to take back residuals, and show how this policy
works equivalently to the second-best D-R policy by applying the theory of tradable
emission permits market. We find that the second-best system of this policy is the
combination of the take-back requirement depending on the amount of each firm’s
outputs and initial exemption from that requirement.
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1 Introduction
The disposal of wastes generated after consumption involves certain costs: financial costs
for appropriate disposal and physical costs as a result of the environmental problems
caused by waste disposal. However, it is often observed that charging consumers directly
for disposal costs is difficult due to the possibility of illegal waste disposal. In such a case,
the disposal fee for consumers generates another cost for the monitoring and prevention of
the illegal disposal of wastes. Choe and Fraser [4] explicitly introduced monitoring cost
into their model and induced the second-best charge on waste collection. Since their pri-
mary aim was to investigate households’ efforts toward waste reduction, they considered
the non-market-based recycling activities that can not be subsidized. If recycling activities
are market-based and so the subsidy on them is feasible, indeed, the deposit-refund (D-R)
policy has been discussed as an ideal policy to internalize disposal cost and avoid the mon-
itoring problem for consumers, which can result in the realization of the first-best policy
(e.g. Dinan [5], Fullerton and Kinnaman [7], Fullerton and Wolverton [8, 9], Palmer and
Walls [15], Walls and Palmer [19]).1
The D-R2 policy is a combination of the tax (deposit) on products due to their disposal
cost and a subsidy (refund) on recycling as a reward for the avoidance of disposal.3 In this
paper, we begin with the construction of a model that considers the disposal and recycling
activities after the consumption of goods4 and explicitly incorporates both the product
market and the recycling market.5 Using this model, we discuss the effect of the charge
or penalty on waste disposal (Pigouvian tax) and the combination of tax on products and
subsidy on recycling (the D-R policy) and further, compare it to the take-back requirement
1Fullerton and Wolverton [9] say that “The point (of the D-R policy) is to avoid the enforceability or
measurement problems of a tax on pollution by applying the tax to observable market transactions · · · and
simultaneously subsidizing other market transactions, · · · .”
2This term is often used to refer to the firms’ voluntary deposit-refund system. Bohm and Russell [2]
analyzed this system. Note that our D-R policy is a distinct one and is formulated by the authorities.
3Fullerton and Wolverton [9] call this policy a two-part instrument (2PI) in a more general context.
4In terms of ordinary environmental economics, wastes and recyclables correspond to emissions and
abatements, respectively. Fullerton and Wolverton [8] point out and summarize this correspondence excel-
lently.
5The abovementioned literatures treat recycling activities only in emission functions and do not consider
abatement markets such as recycling markets. Calcott and Walls [3] pointed out the importance of modeling
recycling markets explicitly.
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in the recycling market (regulation). Then, we seek the optimal policy combinations.
All the past literature considers the non-compliance of households seriously; however,
it neglects the possibility of firms’ illegal waste disposal when the D-R policy is discussed.
But firms as well as households can be non-compliant.6 In the past analyses of the D-R
policy, there is the tacit assumption that the time to give refunds is after the residuals
have been converted to utilizable materials. Obviously, firms have no incentive to dispose
of such valuable materials. However, in reality, the recycling market arises between the
“collecting” process (segregating and collecting residuals after consumption) and the “re-
processing” process (converting the collected residual into utilizable materials). The time
to give refunds is usually when this recycling market is in existence, and giving refunds af-
ter the final reprocessing process is unlikely or costly since the residuals have already been
converted or even if they have not been converted, the input for the reprocessing process
constitutes inside information of firms. Unless all the existing residuals are valuable be-
fore the reprocessing process,7 the firms have the incentive to dispose of the residuals that
are collected to aim at obtaining refunds. As the main feature of our model, we introduce
the recycling market and possibility of firms’ illegal disposal after their transaction in this
market as well as the possibility of households’ illegal disposal after their consumption of
products. Then, explicitly addressing the monitoring cost of illegal disposal, we induce
the second-best D-R policy.
As a result, we find that while the deposit should always be equal to the disposal cost,
the refund, which is the subsidy on collected residuals to encourage recycling, should vary
(it should be smaller than or equal to the disposal cost). In particular, we find that the
monitoring problem for firms can be avoided so long as the refund does not exceed the
price of the recycling market, and this fact brings about a variety in the optimal level of
the refunds.
As a further topic, we investigate the policy with take-back requirements and tradable
emission permits. Under this policy, each firm is required to take back some amount
6There are many reports on firms’ illegal disposal worldwide. For example, in Japan, according to the
Ministry of Environment, in the latter half of 1990’s, the illegally disposed of industrial wastes amounted to
around 40 thousand tons almost every year.
7In such a case, the secondhand products market will arise and, finally, the utilities of the residuals will
be lost.
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of the post-consumption residuals, the amount being allocated according to the quantity
of each firm’s outputs, and firms can transact the gap between this requirement and the
actual reprocessing as tradable rights. Fullerton and Wu [10] point out that the take-back
requirement as well as D-R policy can result in the realization of the first-best policy8 when
there is no monitoring problem. However, as mentioned above, the actual reprocessing
activity is difficult to monitor. We compare the policy with a take-back requirement to the
D-R policy under the situation where firms are non-compliant.
We find that under this extension, to construct the equivalence to the second-best D-R
policy, we must not only adjust the marginal amount of the take-back requirement for each
firm’s outputs but also give each firm some amount of initial exemption from the take-
back requirement. Instead of the initial exemption, the marginal amount of the take-back
requirement should be more than the actual additional residuals corresponding to each
firm’s additional production.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we begin with outlining the
fundamental model and explain the first-best situation. In section 3, this model is extended
by introducing monitoring problem of both households and firms. Then, we investigates
the market behaviors with the tax-subsidy (D-R) policy under the possibility of illegal
disposal and the second-best tax-subsidy policy is induced. In Section 4, the policy with
take-back requirement is introduced and compared with the policy in Section 3. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Fundamental model
A pioneering work in the economics of recycling and waste management is provided by
Vernon Smith (Smith [16]). He constructed a rudimentary model emphasizing the problem
of post-consumption recycling and waste accumulation and found that the Pigouvian tax
in this context is the charge on waste disposal. Dinan [5] reactivates the fields by focusing
8Since Fullerton and Wu [10] assume a representative firm, there is no need to combine the theory of
tradable emission permits with the policy with a take-back requirement to show the equivalence between
the two. We show this equivalence in the model where firms have heterogeneous technologies of both
production and recycling by applying the theory of tradable emission permits. By using such a model, the
process whereby firms reallocate the collecting residuals under the policy with take-back requirements is
clarified.
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on a policy failure for recycling activities. Fullerton and Kinnaman [7] and Palmer and
Walls [15] pointed out that the D-R policy attains the first-best outcomes instead of the
charge on waste disposal in a general equilibrium model and a partial equilibrium model,
respectively. In this paper, by mainly reforming the model of Palmer and Walls [15]9, we
construct the partial equilibrium model of good x, which explicitly incorporates both the
product market and the recycling market. The conceptualization of our model is depicted
in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: the model with a recycling market
2.1 The model with a recycling market
Suppose that given any policy for recycling and waste management, the authorities always
keep an adequately high monitoring level in order to gain the information required to
implement the policy, and put aside the monitoring cost for the present.
There are n firms ( j = 1, 2, · · · , n) producing homogeneous products according to
the strictly increasing and strictly convex cost function Cx j(xsj) : R+ 7→ R+, where xsj is
firm j’s supply of the products. The products are transacted in the product market and
9Their model treats the recycling market implicitly.
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consumed by m households (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m). Ui(xdi ) + yi is household i’s utility function
taking the quasi-linear form, where xdi is household i’s demand for the products. Note that
yi is household i’s demand for numeraire. Ui : R+ 7→ R is strictly increasing and strictly
concave.
Products generate the same amount of residuals as their consumption10. Household
i chooses the method of disposal of the residuals. One way is to supply them to firms
for recycling; thus, rsi is the quantity of residuals disposed of in this manner. Returning
the residuals to firms is costly, and the cost function of this recycling activity is Cri(rsi ) :
R+ 7→ R+, 11 which is strictly increasing and strictly convex. The other way is to convert
residuals into direct wastes from households zhi . d ∈ R++ is the unit damage from this
direct waste disposal (including both external disposal cost and environmental damage).
Thus, if this direct disposal is not adequately charged or penalized, it will have negative
externalities. The direct wastes are monitored by the authorities and the unit charge or
penalty of these direct wastes is τh ∈ R+.12 We suppose that the households separate the
residuals according to simple material balance, xdi = rsi + zhi . 13
The residuals collected for recycling are transacted in the recycling market. Firm j
demands the residuals at the amount rdj . Firm j can gain a benefit by recycling according
to a strictly concave function, B j(rdj ) : R+ 7→ R. Note that we allow B j to be negative since
it contains the cost to reprocess the residuals. 14 To facilitate our analysis, we assume that
10To restrict our attention, we neglect the numeraire’s residuals.
11This cost is interpreted as the transaction cost in the collection process for recycling. Usually, inter-
mediate traders or recyclers participate in the collection process for the consumed products. However, for
simplicity, we suppose that the entire cost in this process is passed on to households. If all the markets for
intermediate traders are competitive, this supposition is not essential.
12If the direct wastes from the households are not monitored, τh = 0. Thus, the households can freely
dispose of the wastes into the environment.
13Many studies in this field use the concept of material balances. In particular, Eichner and Pething [6]
construct the model that pays full attention to material balances. The above simplification of the material
balance does not essentially work to induce our result. A more complex formulation can be used instead of
the simple material balance, which is used only to facilitate our computation.
14In our model, B j is assumed to be exogenously given but it can be interpreted in various ways. More
concretely, B j is defined by B′j = P − C′(rdj ), where P is the exogenously given price and C(rdj ) is the
reprocessing cost. If the firm sells its recycled materials in some other market, P is the market’s price. If
the firm uses recycled materials as inputs for its own products, P is the price of perfectly substitutable virgin
inputs vdj . Note that if we assume the production function of the form xsj = f (rdj +vdj ) and the interior solution
of vdj , we can treat B j and Cx j independently.
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B′j(0) > 015 and that limr→∞ B′j(r) = −∞.16
The prices in the product market and the recycling market are Px ∈ R++ and Pr ∈ R,
respectively. When Pr > 0 (Pr < 0), the firms (households) pay for recycling.17 We
assume that the households and firms are the price takers with regard to all the prices.
The authorities can use the tax t ∈ R (deposit) in the product market, and subsidy s ∈ R
(refund)18 in the recycling market.
Consider the utility maximization problem of household i:
max
xdi ,yi,r
s
i ,z
h
i
Ui(xdi ) + yi.
s.t. Pxxdi + yi + τhz
h
i + Cri(rsi ) ≤ Ii + Prrsi
xdi = z
h
i + r
s
i .
where Ii is household i’s income. Because of our interest, we presume xdi > 0, rsi > 0, and
zhi > 0. In particular, the assumption that zhi > 0 is important since this assumption focuses
our attention on the case where even if the market is under the optimal policy, it is not
desirable to attain zero direct wastes (zero emission) under current recycling technologies.
Owing to the first-order condition with respect to yi and zhi , the Lagrange multiplier of the
first constraint equals one and that of the second constraint equals τh. Taking these into
consideration, the first-order conditions are
U′i (xdi ) = Px + τh, (1)
Pr + τh = Cr′i (rsi ). (2)
15If there are recycling activities in spite of the absence of a policy to encourage them, to judge that
B′j(0) > 0 is accurate, but note that the converse is not true since even if B′j(0) > 0, the collecting cost Cr is
needed.
16We assume this assumption to exclude the case where B j′ decreases asymptotically. Indeed, without
this assumption, we can show all of our propositions. However, to consider the lower bound of B j′, we must
prepare an additional troublesome case in our analysis. Thus, we exclude this case to make our analysis
clear.
17Pr can be negative since the household may pay for recycling to avoid paying the penalty for its disposal.
18It is more precise if our setting with regard to recycling cost is stated in terms of the time to levy the
subsidy. We divide the entire cost of the recycling process into two parts: the cost expended before levying
the subsidy and the cost expended after levying the subsidy. Cri represents the former and the latter is
included in B j. If we consider the realistically feasible time to levy the subsidy, in many cases, these two
(i.e., Cri and some part of B j) will correspond to the collecting cost and reprocessing cost, respectively.
Therefore, in the body of this chapter, we use these terms.
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Consider the profit maximization problem of firm j:
max
xsj,r
d
j
[(Px − t)xsj −Cx j(xsj)] + [B j(rdj ) − (Pr − s)rdj ].
Then, after presuming xsj > 0 and rdj > 0, the first-order conditions for firms are
Px − t = Cx j′(xsj), (3)
B j′(rdj ) = Pr − s. (4)
In this model, social welfare W is defined by
W ≡
m∑
i=1
[Ui(xdi ) − Pxxdi ] +
m∑
i=1
[Prrsi −Cri(rsi )] − τh
m∑
i=1
zhj (5)
+
n∑
j=1
[(Px − t)xsj −Cx j(xsj)] +
n∑
j=1
[B j(rdj ) − (Pr − s)rdj ] (6)
+ τh
m∑
i=1
zhj + t
n∑
j=1
xsj − s
n∑
j=1
rdj − d
m∑
i=1
zhj . (7)
(5) represents the consumer surplus including the payment for direct disposal. (6) is the
producer surplus. Note that the second brackets of (5) and (6) are the surplus related to
recycling activities. (7) is the authorities’ income and expenditure and the environmental
damage from direct disposal. The authorities maximize the welfare under the conditions
for clearing the product and recycling markets and the material balance:
max
xdi ,r
s
i ,x
s
j,r
d
j ,z
h
i
W =
m∑
i=1
[Ui(xdi ) −Cri(rsi )] +
n∑
j=1
[B j(rdj ) −Cx j(xsj)] − d
m∑
i=1
zhi
s.t.
m∑
i=1
xdi =
n∑
j=1
xsj,
n∑
j=1
rdj =
m∑
i=1
rsi ,
m∑
i=1
zhi =
m∑
i=1
xdi −
m∑
i=1
rsi ,
(8)
where W has been arranged by using the market-clearing conditions. After canceling zhi by
the material balance and the Lagrange multipliers of the market-clearing conditions, we
obtain the first-order conditions for the social optimal:
U′i (xdi ) = Cx j′(xsj) + d, (9)
B j′(rdj ) + d = Cr′i (rsi ). (10)
Therefore, by comparing conditions (9) and (10) with conditions (1)–(4) in private
markets, we find that the tax and subsidy t = s = d can attain the first-best outcomes
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as well as the waste charge τh = d. The former is the D-R policy and the latter is the
Pigouvian tax.
2.2 Demand, supply, and equilibrium
To explicitly observe what happens in the product market and the recycling market, let us
consider the demand and supply functions of products and residuals more formally. By
(1) and (3), we obtain the demand and supply functions of products:
xdi (Px; τh) = Ui′−1(Px + τh), (11)
xsj(Px; t) = Cx j′−1(Px − t). (12)
Therefore, the aggregate demand and supply functions of products are
Xd(Px; τh) =
m∑
i=1
Ui′−1(Px + τh), (13)
Xs(Px; t) =
n∑
j=1
Cx j′−1(Px − t). (14)
Suppose that Xd(Px; τh) and Xs(Px; t) are differentiable in a relevant range.
We obtain households’ supply and firms’ demand of residuals from (2) and (4), respec-
tively, as below.
rsi (Pr; τh) = Cri′−1(Pr + τh), (15)
rdj (Pr; s) = B j′−1(Pr − s). (16)
Therefore, the aggregate supply and demand functions of residuals are
Rs(Pr; τh) =
m∑
i=1
Cri′−1(Pr + τh). (17)
Rd(Pr; s) =
n∑
j=1
B j′−1(Pr − s), (18)
Suppose that Rd(Pr; s) and Rs(Pr; τh) are differentiable in a relevant range.
For the later analysis, it is often convenient to use the inverse supply function of resid-
uals. This is obtained from (17) as
Pr(Rs; τh) = Rs−1(Pr; τh) (19)
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for all Rs > 0.
The equilibrium prices, P∗x(t; τh) and P∗r(s; τh), are defined by (13) and (14) and (18)
and (17), respectively to satisfy the following market clear conditions of the product mar-
ket and the recycling market:
Xd(P∗x(t; τh); τh) = Xs[P∗x(t; τh); t] ≡ X∗(t; τh), (20)
Rs(P∗r(s; τh); τh) = Rd[P∗r(s; τh); s] ≡ R∗(s; τh). (21)
The last equivalent terms, X∗(t; τh) and R∗(s; τh), define the aggregate equilibrium out-
comes. Note that P∗r(s; τh) = Pr(R∗(s; τh); τh) by the definition of the inverse supply
function (19). Then, each firm’s equilibrium outcomes, xs∗j (t; τh) and rd∗j (s; τh), and each
household’s equilibrium outcomes, xd∗i (t; τh) and rs∗i (s; τh), are defined by putting equilib-
rium prices into (12) and (16) and (11) and (15), respectively.
xs∗j (t; τh) ≡ xsj[P∗x(t; τh); t] j = 1, 2, · · · , n, (22)
rd∗j (s; τh) ≡ rdj [P∗r(s; τh); s] j = 1, 2, · · · , n, (23)
xd∗i (t; τh) ≡ xdj [P∗x(t; τh); τh] i = 1, 2, · · · ,m, (24)
rs∗i (s; τh) ≡ rsj[P∗r(s; τh); τh] i = 1, 2, · · · ,m. (25)
Comparative statics using (20) and (21) yield the following result.
Lemma 1. Suppose that xs∗j (t; τh), xd∗i (t; τh) > 0 and rs∗i (s; τh), rd∗j (s; τh) > 0 for all i, j.
Then,
∂P∗x
∂t
=
∑n
j=1(1/Cx j′′(xs∗j ))
∆1
> 0, (26)
∂P∗x
∂τh
=
∑m
i=1(1/Ui′′(xd∗i ))
∆1
< 0, (27)
∂X∗
∂t
=
∂X∗
∂τh
=
∑n
j=1(1/Cx j′′)
∑m
i=1(1/Ui′′)
∆1
< 0. (28)
and
∂P∗r
∂s
=
−∑nj=1(1/B j′′(rd∗j ))
∆2
> 0, (29)
∂P∗r
∂τh
=
−∑mi=1(1/Cri′′(rs∗i ))
∆2
< 0, (30)
∂R∗
∂s
=
∂R∗
∂τh
=
−∑mi=1(1/Cri′′) ∑nj=1(1/B j′′)
∆2
> 0. (31)
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where ∆1 =
∑n
j=1(1/Cx j′′(xs∗j )) −
∑m
i=1(1/Ui′′(xd∗i )) > 0 and ∆2 =
∑m
i=1(1/Cri′′(rs∗i )) −∑n
j=1(1/B j′′(rd∗j )) > 0.
From this lemma, we can gain an insight into the reaction of the households and the
firms to the policy instruments. (28) and (31) provide the mathematical decomposition
which represents impacts of the output reduction effect and the input substitution effect
explained below.
Figures 2 and 3 depict the product market and recycling market. To make the discus-
sion clear, we depict the figure supposing that n = m = 1 (one representative household
and one representative firm). (28) and (31) indicate that penalty on waste disposal τh si-
multaneously has two effects– both on product demand and on recycling supply. On the
other hand, tax t and subsidy s have one effect respectively– on product supply and on
recycling demand, respectively. In the product market, as seen in the left panel of Figure
2 (Figure 3), households (firms) become aware that they must bear the penalty (bear the
11
tax) for each additional unit of their consumption (production). This reduces the demand
(supply) of products and contributes to the reduction of waste disposal. This is called the
“output reduction effect.” In the recycling market, as seen in the right panel of Figure 2
(Figure 3), households (firms) can avoid the penalty (gain the subsidy) for each additional
unit of their recycling. This increases the supply (demand) for recycling. Thus, recycling
is encouraged, which results in smaller amounts of waste. This is referred to as the “input
substitution effect.19”
2.3 Illustration of the first-best policy
We illustrate the optimal use of penalty on waste disposal τh, tax on products t, and sub-
sidy on recycling s. By using Figure 4, which depicts the product market and the recycling
market in one figure, we see the socially optimal state and the market failure of this model.
A unit of product imposes a unit disposal damage d on the social welfare and a unit of
recycling saves a unit disposal damage d. Hence, the marginal social cost of production is
Cx j′(xsj) + d and the marginal social benefit of recycling is B j′(rdj ) + d. In the optimal state,
as seen in (9) and (10), these values should balance the marginal utility of production and
the marginal cost of recycling, respectively. Thus, the first-best quantity of products is the
length OC; that for recycling, OB; and for waste disposal, BC. The two shaded triangles
in figure 4 represent the dead weight loss caused when τh = t = s = 0. Under such a
circumstance, the economy neglects the disposal damage d and considers only the produc-
tion cost Cx′1 and recycling benefit B′1. Then, the quantity of products is the length OD;
that for recycling, OA; and for waste disposal, AD. This results in the overproduction of
products, the underproduction of recycling, and the over emission of wastes as compared
to the first-best levels.
The charge on wastes τh, which is the Pigouvian tax on waste disposal, internalizes the
cost and benefit of waste disposal simultaneously since it causes both the output reduction
effect and the input substitution effect. We can accomplish the first-best outcomes by
using charge on wastes τh = d as seen in figure 4. Notice that the combination of tax t
and subsidy s also internalizes the cost and benefit of waste disposal instead of the charge
19Walls [17] introduced these terms into the economics of waste and recycling management.
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on wastes τh. Since tax t causes the output reduction effect and subsidy s causes the input
substitution effect, they reduce the dead weight loss by internalizing the cost of disposal
and the benefit of avoidable disposal, respectively. When t = s = d, the dead weight loss
disappears and the outcomes reach the first-best level, as seen in figure 4.
Px, Pr
x1, r1
t
τh
s
U′1(xd1)
Cr′1(rs1)
B′1(rd1)
Cx′1(xs1)
τh
Cx′1(xs1) + d
B′1(rd1) + d
A BO C D
Figure 4: D-R policy and charge on waste disposal. x1: quantity of products. r1: quantity of
recycling. Px: price of products. Pr: price of recycling. Cx1: production cost. U1: utility from
consumption. Cr1: recycling cost. B1: benefit from recycling. d: unit damage from waste disposal.
3 Monitoring problem
3.1 Setting
We will introduce the possibility of firms’ illegal disposal and monitoring cost of both
households’ and firms’ disposal activities into a partial equilibrium model of good x in
Section 2. The modified conceptualization of our model is depicted in Figure 5. Similar
to the model in Section 2, there are n firms and m households who transact the products in
the product market and residuals in the recycling market. Their cost functions and utility
(benefit) functions are same in Section 2.
As well as the households separate the residuals according to simple material balance,
xdi = z
h
i + r
s
i , firm j can directly dispose of the collected residuals instead of completing
the reprocessing process after it demands the residuals at the amount rdj . rcj represents the
quantity of residuals completely and appropriately reprocessed by firm j; z fj , the amount of
13
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Figure 5: the model with monitoring problem
firm j’s direct waste disposal. Again, we suppose the simple material balance rdj = z fj + rcj .
Firm j can gain the benefit by reprocessing rcj according to the function, B j(rcj), which
is defined in Section 2 (Just the argument is replaced with rcj). We denote the aggregate
quantities Zh ≡ ∑mi=1 zhi , Rc ≡ ∑nj=1 rcj and Z f ≡ ∑nj=1 z fj .
Similarly to the unit expected penalty of the direct wastes from the households τh ∈
R+, the direct wastes from the firms are also monitored by the authorities and the unit
expected penalty is τ f ∈ R+. The direct disposal activities of both households and firms
generate some social cost with a constant marginal external damage of d ∈ R++. Thus, if
these disposal activities are not adequately charged or penalized, they will have negative
externalities.
We assume that only the market-based information of the firms, that is, (xs1, · · · , xsn)
in the product market and (rd1 , · · · , rdn) in the recycling market, is observable and verifi-
able for the policy maker. Thus, we assume that the market-based information to impose
the tax and give the subsidy is perfect. Since it is difficult to obtain information about
each household’s consumption and disposal activities, we suppose that the information of
the households, (xd1, · · · , xdn) or (rs1, · · · , rsn), is unobservable. The amount of each firm’s
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complete recycling (rc1, · · · , rcn) cannot be observed because this constitutes firms’ inside
information. Therefore, the households can dispose of their residuals directly by saying
that they have not consumed the products or have recycled them appropriately, and the
firms can, deceiving the authorities by pretending to reprocess the residuals. However, the
authorities can monitor which household or firm directly disposes of the residuals. In other
words, a part of zhi and z
f
j can be made observable and verifiable by the monitoring.20
The authorities control the expected penalties of households’ and firms’ direct dis-
posal, τh and τ f , by way of monitoring. Expected penalties are determined by multiply-
ing the unit penalties by the probabilities of detecting disposal activities.21 To increase
these factors, more powerful monitoring is needed.22 It costs Γh(τh) : R+ 7→ R+ and
Γ f (τ f ) : R+ 7→ R+ to monitor the households’ and firms’ disposal, respectively, where Γh
and Γ f are convex and strictly increasing functions.23
Under these settings, after using the conditions for clearing two markets, X ≡ ∑mi=1 xdi =∑n
j=1 x
s
j and R ≡
∑n
j=1 r
d
j =
∑m
i=1 r
s
i , we can define and arrange social welfare W as
W =
m∑
i=1
[Ui(xdi )−Cri(rsi )]+
n∑
j=1
[B j(rcj)−Cx j(xsj)]−d[
m∑
i=1
zhj +
n∑
j=1
z fj ]−Γh(τh)−Γ f (τ f ). (32)
3.2 Behaviors of firms
Since the model is modified by introducing the possibility of firms’ illegal disposal, the
utility maximization problem of each household is the same as is described in Section 2.
On the other hand, the profit maximization problem of firm j is modified as below.
max
xsj,r
d
j ,r
c
j ,z
f
j
[(Px − t)xsj −Cx j(xsj)] + [B j(rcj) − τ f z fj − (Pr − s)rdj ]
s.t. rdj = z
f
j + r
c
j .
(33)
20To verify z fj (zhi ), the authorities may monitor rcj (xdi and rsi ) instead of z fj (zhi ).
21To introduce monitoring into our model, we mainly follow the formulation adopted by Choe and
Fraser [4].
22To raise the probability of detection, more searching and observation, which increases the monitoring
cost, are needed. Furthermore, we assume that the cost to enforce someone to pay the penalty gets higher as
the unit penalty is raised or that the feasible penalty have upper bound. In reality, firms’ penalty for illegal
wastes usually constitutes the duty to return to the original state and compensation for victims. But it is often
difficult to levy the penalty because of the incentive to evade it and the relevant firm’s low ability to pay. See
Becker [1] for additional details about monitoring cost.
23Our setting includes the simple linear formulation of monitoring cost, that is, Γ(τ) = γτ, which is often
used; for examples, in the context of environmental economics on monitoring, see Lee [12], etc.
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Similarly to Section 2, we presume xdj > 0, rdj > 0. Then, the first-order conditions with
respect to xdj and rdj are
Px − t = Cx j′(xsj), (34)
µ j = Pr − s, (35)
and further, the first-order conditions with respect to rcj and z
f
j are
B j′(rcj) ≤ µ j with equality if rcj > 0, (36)
− τ f ≤ µ j with equality if z fj > 0, (37)
where µ j is the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint. This is considered as the marginal
shadow cost to dispose of residuals for firms.
Figure 6 depicts the product market and recycling market (depicted by supposing that
m = n = 1). If all the collected residuals are supposed to be recycled completely (rd1 = rc1),
the firm’s demand curve for residuals is Pr = B′1 + s by (36) and (35). On the other hand,
if all the collected residuals are supposed to be disposed of directly (rd1 = z f1), the firm’s
demand curve of residuals is Pr = s − τ f by (35) and (37). By tracing the upper curve
between the marginal benefit of recycling (B′1 + s) and that of direct disposal (s − τ f ), we
obtain the firm’s demand curve of residuals, represented by the bold line `1. On this curve,
the firm recycles the collected residuals from point O till A and disposes of them directly
beyond the point A.
From this figure, we can gain an insight into how the households and firms react to
policy instruments. Similarly to Section 2, from the first-order conditions, we find the
supply curve of residuals (`2), the demand curve of products (`3), and the supply curve of
products (`4). Consequently, under the policy set in Figure 6, the equilibrium outcomes
xd1 = x
s
1 are determined to be length OC; rd1 = rs1, length OB; zh1, length BC; rc1, length OA;
and z f1 , length AB. We illustrate the case where both the household and firm emit direct
wastes. On the other hand, if we have τh = 0 and s = 0; xd1 = xs1 is found to be length
OC’; rd1 = rs1 = rc1, length OA’; zh1, length A’C’; and z
f
1 = 0, at the equilibrium. While τh
and s encourage the reduction of wastes and the promotion of recycling, they can make
direct disposal more beneficial for firms than complete recycling, if the monitoring level
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Figure 6: Reactions to the policy instruments
τ f is not enough. To encourage recycling, the authorities intend to provide some incentive
for recycling by subsidizing collected residuals or levying penalty on households’ wastes.
The direct effect of this incentive, however, works on the collecting activities, not on the
reprocessing activities. Therefore, this policy can make firms collect more residuals than
the amount of residuals that they would like to reprocess. In other words, it is excessive
encouragement (relative to monitoring) that provides firms with the incentive to directly
dispose of residuals.
Then, to induce the optimal policy, we can exclude the situations where the firms
directly dispose of their residuals. As stated above, excess encouragement provides firms
with the incentive to directly dispose of residuals. Thus, if there is some direct disposal
from firms, we can prevent it by reducing τh or s. Moreover, we can adjust the reduction
level so that firms’ direct wastes are converted into household wastes and other things
remain constant. This saves the collecting cost of residuals, resulting in the improvement
of the welfare. The following lemma states this fact. Let Z∗f (t, s; τ f , τh) be the equilibrium
outcome of firms’ aggregate direct disposal under a policy set (t, s; τ f , τh).
Lemma 2. When Z∗f (¯t, s¯; τ¯ f , τ¯h) > 0 for a given policy set (t, s; τ f , τh) = (¯t, s¯; τ¯ f , τ¯h), there
exists an alternative policy set which improves welfare.
Proof. See the appendix. Q.E.D.
From Lemma 2, under the optimal policy, we can concentrate our discussion on such
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policies that can attain zero direct waste disposal from firms. To make the model tractable,
from this point until the end of this paper, we make the assumption that the model has a
unique optimal policy with respect to (t, s; τ f , τh)24.
4 Second-best tax-subsidy policy
In this section, we induce the optimal tax-subsidy policy to internalize the disposal cost
and monitoring cost. When the authorities maximize the welfare, we can show that the
D-R policy, which takes monitoring cost into account, arises as the optimal policy.
For this, we solve the optimal taxation problem. This is solved by two steps. First,
given policy variables, market equilibrium outcomes are derived. Second, given these
outcomes, welfare is maximized with respect to tax, subsidy, and the expected penalties of
direct disposal.
4.1 Equilibrium outcomes
As the first step, we define the equilibrium outcomes and investigate how these outcomes
are influenced by policy variables. By lemma 2, in order to induce the optimal policy,
it is adequate if we investigate the policies that can attain zero illegal wastes from firms.
Therefore, we suppose that the authorities always monitor firms at an adequately high level
for that. To induce such a monitoring policy, first, we assume the demand (18), which is
defined under the supposition that Z f = 0, is the real demand of residuals for defining
the equilibrium outcome. Under this supposition, since we assume that zhi exhibits an
interior solution, the equilibrium outcomes of products and residuals can described as
{xs∗j (t; τh), rd∗j (s; τh)}nj=1 and {xd∗i (t; τh), rs∗i (s; τh)}mi=1, and the aggregate outcomes of them as
{X∗(t; τh),R∗(s; τh)}, which are precisely defined in Section 2.2.
Now, we seek the monitoring policy that realizes the abovementioned supposition.
How should the authorities monitor firms such that they attain zero direct wastes from
firms? For this, the authorities should maintain the monitoring level high enough according
24Note that since rdj = r
c
j under the optimal policy from Lemma 2, the equilibrium under the optimal
policy must exhibit an interior solution with respect to (xsj, rdj , rcj) for all j and (xdi , rsi , zhi ) for all i, that is, all
the equilibrium outcomes except for z fi are assumed to be positive.
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Figure 7: Optimal monitoring rule
to the optimal monitoring rule τ∗f (s; τh) defined as
τ∗f (s; τh) =
s − P∗r(s; τh) if s > P∗r(s; τh),0 if s ≤ P∗r(s; τh). (38)
Lemma 3. If τ f , τ∗f (s, τh), we can improve the welfare.
The proof is plausible if we see the Figure 7 (depicted by supposing that m = n = 1).
When s > P∗r , as seen in the left panel of the figure, we must have z
f
j > 0 if there is no
monitoring for firms (τ f = 0). Thus, by Lemma 2, we can improve the welfare as far as τ f
is not enough large. To be z fj = 0 under this situation, the monitoring level must increase
to the levels such that satisfy s − τ f ≤ P∗r ; equivalently τ f ≥ s − P∗r . Since the monitoring
cost is strictly increasing in τ f , τ f > s − P∗r is not optimal. When s ≤ P∗r , as seen in the
right panel of the figure, we have z fj = 0 even if τ f = 0. Therefore, τ f > 0 is not optimal
due to the positive monitoring cost (the boundary case).
When the authorities maintain the monitoring at a level that is high enough according
to the optimal monitoring rule, that is, τ f = τ∗f (s; τh), we can write the equilibrium outcome
of complete recycling as rc∗j (s; τh) = rd∗j (s; τh) for all j and the aggregate outcome of them
as Rc∗(s; τh) = R∗(s; τh). The equilibrium outcome of households’ wastes Z∗h(t, s; τh) can be
defined by the entire economy’s material balance. That is, Z∗h(t, s; τh) = X∗(t; τh)−R∗(s; τh),
because now, we have Z∗f (t, s; τ∗f (s; τh), τh) = 0 owing to the optimal monitoring rule.
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4.2 Welfare maximization
Next, given these equilibrium outcomes and the optimal monitoring rules, we will proceed
to the second step, in which we determine the policy set to maximize welfare. The welfare
maximization problem for the authorities is described as follows:
max
t,s;τh
W∗(t, s; τh) ≡
m∑
i=1
[Ui(xd∗i (t; τh)) −Cri(rs∗i (s; τh))] +
n∑
j=1
[B j(rd∗j (s; τh))
−Cx j(xs∗j (t; τh))] − d[X∗(t; τh) − R∗(s; τh)] − Γh(τh) − Γ f (τ∗f (s; τh)). (39)
First of all, the monitoring problem for households should be prevented by the zero
penalty of households’ waste disposal.
Proposition 1. Under the optimal policy, the authorities always set τh = 0.
Proof. See the appendix. Q.E.D.
Therefore, henceforth, we focus on the case where τh = 0 and omit τh from the argument
if it is unnecessary.
Remark 1 With regard to the policy for households, we always have τh = 0. The mon-
itoring problem for households should be prevented by free direct waste disposal. Note
that this is true even if the monitoring cost for households is less than that for firms.25 If
τh > 0, the supply curve of recycling shifts to the right and their price falls. This en-
courages firms not only to reprocess the residuals but also to dispose of them directly. In
other words, the incentive for direct disposal spills over by way of the price of residu-
als. Consequently, both households and firms must be monitored to effectively operate the
penalty on households’ direct disposal. Therefore, using only the policy for firms saves the
trouble of monitoring households. This result supports the concept of extended producer
responsibility (EPR) proposed by the OECD.26
25If the market-based subsidy to some firms is not feasible, it is possible that τh > 0 in the optimal policy,
e.g., in the case that there are some unobservable very small businesses engages in recycling activities.
Households’ efforts with regard to waste reduction investigated in Choe and Fraser [4] is essentially what
is observed in this case. Thus, the subsidy level of the policy with monitoring induced in Proposition 2 is
consistent with the second-best charge on waste collection induced by them.
26See the OECD [14] for past discussions on EPR.
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To solve the problem (39), we divide the situation into two cases according to the
pattern of the optimal monitoring rule. One case is that where the authorities implement
some monitoring for firms, τ∗f (s) > 0. This case arises if and only if s > P∗r by the
definition of the optimal monitoring rule. The other case is that in which the authorities do
not monitor the firms, τ∗f (s) = 0. This case arises if and only if s ≤ P∗r . Hence, before we
begin the analysis, we translate the conditions that determine whether or not s > P∗r into
the terms of subsidy. For this, we can find a threshold subsidy level sˆ.
Lemma 4. There uniquely exists sˆ > 0, s Q P∗r(s) if and only if s Q sˆ.
Proof. See the appendix. Q.E.D.
If we set the subsidy as smaller than sˆ, the price to take back the residuals is higher
than the subsidy. Since the unit gain from direct waste disposal for firms is s− τ f , it is not
beneficial to take back and directly dispose of such residuals even if τ f = 0. As a result,
the firms do not have an incentive to directly dispose of collected residuals even without
monitoring. Therefore, sˆ is the upper limit of the subsidy level, which does not require
firms to be monitored. In other words, under the optimal monitoring rules, τ∗f (s) > 0 if
and only if s > sˆ. Therefore, we use sˆ to describe the two cases mentioned above.
Now, we are ready to investigate the welfare maximization problem for the authorities.
First, suppose that the authorities implement some monitoring for firms, that is, s > sˆ
under the optimal policy. In this case, the first-order conditions of the problem (39) with
respect to t and s are
∂W∗(t, s)
∂t
=
m∑
i=1
∂xd∗i
∂t
U′i −
n∑
j=1
∂xs∗j
∂t
Cx′j − d
∂X∗
∂t
= 0, (40)
∂W∗(t, s)
∂s
=
n∑
j=1
∂rd∗j
∂s
B j′ −
m∑
i=1
∂rs∗i
∂s
Cr′i + d
∂R∗
∂s
−
[
1 − ∂P
∗
r
∂s
]
Γ′f = 0. (41)
We assume that the second-order conditions are globally satisfied when s > sˆ.27 From
(40)–(41), we obtain the optimal tax tM and subsidy sM.
27For example, if we suppose the quadratic cost functions and the quadratic utility and benefit functions,
we can easily see that these are satisfied.
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Proposition 2. Suppose the authorities implement some monitoring for firms. Then, the
optimal tax and subsidy are (tM, sM), which satisfies
tM = d, sM = d − A(sM),
where
A(sM) ≡ − Γ
′
f (τ∗f (sM))∑n
j=1[1/B j′′(rd∗j (sM))]
> 0.
We refer to this policy set as the policy with monitoring.28
Proof. See the appendix. Q.E.D.
The policy set in Proposition 2 and Proposition 1 is the system of imposing a tax (de-
posit) on the products, the reduced subsidy (refund) on taken-back residuals, and the zero
penalty for household waste to avoid monitoring for households. If the marginal monitor-
ing cost Γ′f is infinitesimal, the induced policy is tM = sM = d. This is consistent with the
first-best Deposit-Refund policy discussed in many studies (see Section 2). However, if
the marginal monitoring cost is not zero, the optimal unit refund is smaller than the amount
corresponding to the unit deposit. The reason for this is as follows. If the authorities adopt
the policy wherein a subsidy is offered for collected residuals to encourage recycling ac-
tivities, it could be beneficial for the firms to dispose of the collected residuals directly (in
some cheaper but illegal and inefficient way) to aim at obtaining the subsidy. Thus, the
authorities must bear monitoring costs to prevent such negative activities. Therefore, the
subsidy should be reduced from the first-best level upon considering this second cost.
Next suppose that the authorities do not implement monitoring for firms, that is, s ≤ sˆ
under the optimal policy. In this case, while the first-order condition with respect to t is
the same as (40), the first-order condition with respect to s is modified as
∂W∗(t, s)
∂s
=
n∑
j=1
∂rd∗j
∂s
B j′(rd∗j ) −
m∑
i=1
∂rs∗i
∂s
Cr′i (rs∗i ) + d
∂R∗
∂s
≥ 0 with equality if s < sˆ. (42)
28Note that A is the information in recycling market since we have the relation
Γ′f∑
j(1/B j′′)
=
Γ′f
dRd/dPr
=
PrΓ′f
R
(
dPr/Pr
dRd/R
)
=
PrΓ′f
RηdR
.
where ηdR represents the elasticity of the aggregate demand of residuals.
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By (40) and (42), we obtain the optimal tax and subsidy in this case, which is denoted
by (tN , sN) to distinguish it from the policy with monitoring in Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. Suppose the authorities do not implement monitoring for firms. Then, the
optimal tax and subsidy are (tN , sN), which satisfies
tN = d, sN =
d if d < sˆ,sˆ if d ≥ sˆ.
We refer to this policy set as the policy without monitoring.
Proof. See the appendix. Q.E.D.
The optimal tax on products is same as in the case of Proposition 2. We, however,
obtain peculiar results with regard to the optimal subsidy. To obtain sN , we must consider
two further cases in this situation: (i) d < sˆ and (ii) d ≥ sˆ. Recall that the authorities
can use subsidy without monitoring as far as the subsidy does not exceed sˆ. On the other
hand, if we fully encourage the recycling activities without considering the monitoring
problem, the subsidy should be equal to the externality of direct disposal d. Therefore,
when (i) d < sˆ, we have sN = d because there is no need to worry about monitoring.
This case indicates that even if we consider the monitoring problem for firms, the first-
best D-R policy is feasible when the recycling is so highly developed that the price of
residuals is higher than the full-encouragement subsidy s = d (See Lemma 4). On the
other hand, when (ii) d ≥ sˆ, if the authorities set the subsidy at the first-best level, they
must implement monitoring. Thus, to encourage recycling activities, as far as possible to
avoid monitoring, sN = sˆ is desirable. In this case, the subsidy should equals the price of
the recycling market by Lemma 4. In other words, the authorities can not subsidize the
recycling activities more than the subrogation of collecting cost.29
Now, is it desirable to implement monitoring for firms or not?
Proposition 4. The policy with monitoring is the optimal policy if and only if d > sˆ+A(sM).
29For example, in Japan’s “Act for recycling of containers and package,” the local governments rather than
the firms are responsible for collecting residuals. According to the results of Proposition 3, this policy is
rational if the government regards the monitoring cost of the firms as too great to implement the monitoring
but the externality of direct disposal is higher than the collecting cost.
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cases d > sˆ + A(sM) otherwise
d ≥ sˆ d < sˆ
tax t d
subsidy s d − A(sM) sˆ d
monitor τ f τ∗f (sM) > 0 0
monitor τh 0
Table 1: Optimal Policy Set
Proof. See the appendix. Q.E.D.
Our results with regard the second-best policy are somewhat complicated. For conve-
nience, Table 1 summarizes the results of Proposition 1 to 4. Lastly, in this section, we
provide some supplemental comments about the optimal tax-subsidy policy.
Remark 2 In any case, regardless of the state of affairs with regard to recycling, the op-
timal pre-tax on a unit product due to the reason of future disposal is its marginal disposal
cost in equilibrium. We presume the situation where Z∗h > 0 under the optimal policy.
Thus, if attention is paid to the additional production in equilibrium, the structure where
direct waste disposal is the only option for disposal30 appears in our model. Thus, we al-
ways have t = d since the tax in our model works as the advanced disposal fee on products
due to the disposal cost.
Remark 3 The optimal subsidy level on residuals to encourage recycling should vary:
the level of full encouragement s = d, the level subsidizing only the collecting cost s =
sˆ(≤ d), and the moderate level considering monitoring cost s = d − A(> sˆ). Which level is
desirable is determined according to the relation among monitoring cost, disposal cost, and
recycling technology. Figure 8 depicts the pattern of the optimal subsidy.31 The horizontal
axis represents the disposal cost d. When the disposal cost is small (d < sˆ) relative to
given recycling technology, since the price of recycling market P∗r(s) is higher than the
subsidy s even under the full encouragement s = d, the first-best policy can be achieved
30Wertz [20] constructed such a model, showed that the disposal fee should equal the corresponding
disposal cost, and analyzed its effects on the demand for products.
31This figure is depicted in the case of the quadratic cost functions and the quadratic utility and benefit
functions.
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without monitoring. When the disposal cost gets larger (d > sˆ), if the full encouragement
s = d is implemented, P∗r(s) is less than s and thus, the firms have the incentive to dispose
the collected residuals. Therefore, the input substitution effect should be “weakened” to
avoid the monitoring problem of them. At first, when d < sˆ + A, the authorities set s = sˆ
(and achieve P∗r(s) = s) not to bear monitoring cost for the firms. However, if the disposal
cost gets further larger, the difference between t and s expands. This difference generates
distortion since the waste reduction is biased toward the output reduction effect. Therefore,
finally, when d > sˆ + A, the authorities set s > sˆ and implement monitoring considering
the trade off between the abovementioned distortion and monitoring cost.
t, s
d
sˆ
sˆ
t
s
A(sM)
sˆ + A(sM)
without with
monitoring
Figure 8: Second-best tax and subsidy
5 Policy with a take-back requirement and tradable rights
In the previous section, we analyzed the D-R policy. Indeed for economical analysis, it is
convenient to consider tax and subsidy as benchmarks, but in actual policies to encourage
recycling, the authorities often regulate the firms and require them to take back their prod-
ucts’ residuals. In this section, we consider the case wherein authorities implement a pol-
icy with such a take-back requirement. More concretely, each firm has the responsibility
to collect residuals depending on the amount they produce. To make this policy feasible,
the authorities must know the amount of each firm’s products and collecting residuals. In
our paper, we assumed that (xs1, · · · , xsn) and (rd1 , · · · , rdn) are observable. Therefore, the
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authorities can enforce the take-back requirement of residuals.32
Consider the situation where all firms have homogeneous technology for production
and recycling, and the monitoring problem is put aside for the present. Under this situation,
it is evident that even in our model, as Fullerton and Wu [10] showed, the policy with a
take-back requirement works well in the settings in which the authorities only require firms
to take back appropriate quantity of residuals33 and each firm recycles exactly the amount
it collects.
Our model, however, allows the heterogeneity of firms’ production and recycling tech-
nology. Thus, the recycling depending on each firm’s outputs is not efficient, because each
firm’s recycling technology need not be related to the production technology. Therefore,
a market for the resale of the collected residuals among firms must arise. In this market,
collecting residuals will be transacted from the firms that produce much but have lower
recycling technology to the firms that produce little but have higher recycling technology.
Hence, it is also important for the authorities to prepare an appropriate system for such
transactions and not just enforce the take-back requirement. To formalize this market, we
apply the theory of tradable emission permits market, because of tractability and elegancy
of formulation and the possibility of variety in interpretation for real systems34.
5.1 Behaviors of firms
Even when the authorities use the policy with a take-back requirement, the behaviors of
households is the same as is described in Section 2. Noting this, we begin to investigate
the behaviors of firms.
We consider the system to trade the collecting residuals as follows. At the outset, each
firm has the responsibility to take back residuals in proportion to the amount of its own
output. αxsj represents the amount that firm j is required to take back. α ∈ R+ is a policy
parameter and this can be interpreted as the momentousness of firms’ responsibility to their
32In this paper, residuals are anonymous. This means that the residuals are not distinguished with regard
to the firm that produced them. Hence, it is the quantity of taking-back residuals that is required.
33The authorities should put firms under obligation to take back x − W∗/n of residuals, where x is the
common quantity of each firm’s outputs and W∗ is the desirable amount of direct disposal. Readers will be
able to understand this easily form the rest of analysis of this section.
34In real world, the United Kingdom has the tradable credit scheme applied to packaging waste. See
Walls [18] in detail.
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products’ residuals. If a firm collects more residuals than is required, that is, rdj − αxsj > 0,
the firm can contract to take over other firms’ responsibility verifiably. In other words,
the firm can sell the right to be exempted from the responsibility to take back the same
amount of residuals as it has excessively collected. Based on our context, we call this right
tradable rights of exemption from take-back requirement (TRET). Conversely, if a firm’s
collection of residuals is less than the responsibility, that is, rdj − αxsj < 0, the firm must
buy TRET at the amount of deficiency. Summing up, rdj −αxsj represents firm j’s supply of
TRET; and αxsj − rdj , the demand. The authorities also supply TRET. Similar to the TRET
that the firms supply, if the firms hold this, they can avoid the responsibility of collecting
residuals by the amount that they hold. The authorities supply these rights by some means
independent from firms’ control variables.35 The authorities control the total amount of
TRET that they supply, ZT ∈ R+.
We denote the competitive price of the TRET by PT . Then, the profit maximization
problem of firm j is
max
xsj,r
d
j ,r
c
j ,z
f
j
[Pxxsj −Cx j(xsj)] + [B j(rcj) − τ f z fj − Prrdj ] − PT (αxsj − rdj )
s.t. rdj = z
f
j + r
c
j.
(43)
After presuming xsj > 0 and rdj > 0, the first-order conditions are
Px − αPT = Cx j′(xsj), (44)
µ j = Pr − PT , (45)
B j′(rcj) ≤ µ j with equality if rcj > 0, (46)
−τ f ≤ µ j with equality if z fj > 0. (47)
These conditions are the same as those under the D-R policy (34)-(37) except that t is
replaced by αPT and s is replaced by PT . If a firm raises its output by one unit, the amount
required for collection increases by α units. Thus, the firm must buy additional α units of
TRET. Hence, the price of TRET multiplied by α plays the role of output tax. If a firm
raises its collection by one unit, it can reduce its demand of TRET or increase its supply
35For example, the TRET supplied by the authorities can be initiated by a grandfathering system or auc-
tion.
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of TRET by one unit. Therefore, the price of TRET also plays the role of subsidy in the
collection of residuals.
5.2 Welfare comparison
We will examine whether the policy with a take-back requirement is as effective as the
second-best D-R policy described in Subsection 4.2. First of all, we can check the follow-
ing situation never attain the welfare level in the second-best D-R policy.
Lemma 5. When Z f > 0 or τh > 0 in a policy with take-back requirement, the second-best
D-R policy is always superior to this policy.
Proof. See the appendix. Q.E.D.
Therefore, we focus on the situation where ∀ j, z j = 036 and τh = 0.37 In this situation, by
replacing (t, s) with (αPT , PT ) and fixing τh = 0,38 we can describe the equilibrium prices
and outcomes given the price of TRET by using those in Subsection 2.2.
The price of TRET is determined by the market clear condition,
αX∗(αPT ) − R∗(PT ) = ZT . (48)
From this condition, we can show the following.
Lemma 6. If PT > 0, (α,ZT ) and (αPT , PT ) are one to one by (48).
Proof. See the appendix. Q.E.D.
Therefore, although the true control variables are the policy variables, α and ZT , we can
treat αPT and PT as the control variables instead of them. Write ZT as satisfying (48) in
the form ZT = ZT (αPT , PT ).
36On the tradable emission permit (TEP) market when firms are non-compliant, see Malik [13] for a more
advanced discussion. The study discusses the problem wherein the existence of non-compliant firms can
make the TEP market suboptimal. However, in our model, we can avoid such a problem, since firms are
potentially non-compliant but in the equilibrium under the optimal policy, they are compliant.
37The existence of free penalty for households’ wastes is another difference from Fullerton and Wu [10].
In their model, firms themselves directly dispose of residuals instead of the households when there is a take-
back requirement. In our model, however, such a situation cannot be optimal since extra collecting cost Cr
is introduced.
38Therefore, we omit τh from the argument.
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By viewing control variables in this way, we can obtain the welfare maximization
problem entirely dual to the problem (39) by fixing τh = 0.39 Then, if we replace t and s
in Section 4 with αPT and PT in this section, respectively, we can get a perfectly parallel
optimal solution. Hence, we obtain the following Proposition.
Proposition 5. The optimal policy with a take-back requirement works equivalently to the
optimal D-R policy.
However, observe that tM > sM or tN > sN if d > sˆ in Section 4; therefore, similarly
αMPMT > P
M
T and αN PNT > PNT if d > sˆ, where superscript “M” represents the optimal
value with monitoring of each valuable, and superscript “N” represents the optimal value
without monitoring of each valuable. Thus, in each case, the required momentousness of
responsibility to the residuals of additional production, αM and αN , must be more than
actual additional residuals 1.
It may sound strange to assert that αM > 1, because this regulation seems to require
firms to collect non-existent residuals. However, this is not the case, because to fill the gap,
the authorities supply more TRET than the wastes that are actually directly disposed of by
households. From (48) and αM > 1, ZT (αMPMT , PMT ) ≡ ZMT = αMXM−RM > ZMh ≡ XM−RM,
where XM ≡ X∗(αMPMT ) and RM ≡ R∗(PMT ). The relation between take-back requirement
and actual residuals are depicted in Figure 9. If ZMT = ZMh , the take-back requirement
must exceed the rest of the actual residuals other than the wastes directly disposed of. By
setting ZMT > ZMh , as we can seen at the point E in the figure, these two matches each other
in equilibrium. The same discussion holds true for αN > 1.
Proposition 6. When d > sˆ, we must have α > 1 and ZT > Zh under the optimal policy.
In reality, ZT will be distributed in an output-based form rather than in the form of
TRET. More concretely, the amount of take-back requirement αX − ZT is zero when X =
ZT/α. Then, if firms produce away from these points, the requirement rises and falls at the
rate α. In other words, the initial exemption points of the requirement, which are equal
39Note that since PT plays the role of subsidy, to attain zero direct disposal from firms, we should adopt
the optimal monitoring rule τ∗f (PT ), which is defined in Subsection 4.1, and to check the pattern of the
optimal monitoring rule, we can use the subsidy level sˆ.
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to ZMT /α
M (if the points are summed up), based on firms’ output, are offered to each firm.
When d > sˆ, from α > 1 and R > 0, this initial-exemption level is greater than the optimal
wastes, that is, ZT/α = X − R/α > X − R = Zh (See the Figure 9).
outputs X
actual residuals
take-back reqirement
initial exemption ZMT /αM
= X
= αMX − ZMT
XM
0
−ZMh
RM
the rest of residuals
other than optimal wastes
= X − ZMh
−ZMT
E
Figure 9: Structure of take-back requirement
6 Concluding remarks
We investigated the optimal D-R policy with monitoring cost under the circumstance
where illegal disposal on the part of both households and firms can occur and the pol-
icy instruments are the tax on products, the subsidy on collected residuals, and monitoring
for households and firms. In this system, the authorities should set the penalty for house-
hold waste to zero and monitor firms instead of households. The deposit should always
be equal to the disposal cost since this is the advanced fee on products due to the disposal
cost, but the refund, which is the subsidy on collected residuals to encourage recycling,
should vary according to the relation among monitoring cost, disposal cost, and recycling
technology and typically be smaller than the first best level.
Further, we compared the policy with a take-back requirement to the D-R policy. We
find that the second-best system of this policy is the combination of the take-back re-
quirement depending on the amount of each firm’s outputs and initial exemption from that
requirement. Although, even if there exists a monitoring problem, the two policies work
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equivalently, the marginal momentousness of the take-back requirement, should typically
be larger than the actual additional waste generation. In this case, the initial exemption of
take-back requirement should be given to the firms and the amount of this exemption is
larger than the optimal wastes.
Finally, we point out the limitation of our model and the possibility of future research.
First, we focus on the situation where the zero emission is not optimal and the benefit
function of recycling is given exogenous. Owing to these assumptions, we can treat the
prices of product market and recycling market independently, and decompose the output
reduction effect and the input substitution effect. Second, we used a very simple formu-
lation with regard to monitoring. More generally, Γh or Γ f can depend on the amount of
violation, zhi or z
f
j . If we use such an extended formulation, positive violation arises in the
equilibrium under the optimal policy. This affects the price of TRET and the policy with
a take-back requirement will be less effective. Third, we focused on one kind of good in
the partial equilibrium model. However, more generally, if the other goods have external-
ity with regard to disposal cost, it is possible that the internalizing disposal cost of good
x causes more externality in the other goods. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the
relations with the other goods. In reality, we should prepare a list on the waste generation
rates of various kinds of goods that have high substitutability with each other,40 and si-
multaneously internalize the disposal cost. Fourth, we investigated the situation where the
residuals of each firm’s products are anonymous. But sometimes, especially in the case
where there are several famous makers in the market, the authorities can trace down which
firm’s products the illegally disposed residuals are. Using this type of monitoring, the au-
thorities can require firms to take back the residuals of their own products in the name of
EPR.41 This may be cheaper than monitoring which firm illegally disposes of the residuals.
Therefore, when this type of monitoring is feasible, we can predict the possibility that the
policy with EPR is supported over the D-R policy.
40For example, in Japan, such a list is made for the policy to recycle packages and containers.
41Ino [11] analyzes the residuals that are not anonymous in an oligopoly market and the policy with EPR.
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Appendix
Lemma 2
Proof. First, we describe the demand in the recycling market. From (35), (36), and (37),
the demand correspondence of rdj is described as
rdj (Pr; s, τ f ) =
B j′−1(Pr − s) if Pr − s ≥ −τ f[rˆ j(τ f ),∞) if Pr − s = −τ f , (49)
where rˆ j(τ f ) ≡ B j′−1(−τ f ). Therefore, the aggregate demand correspondence of collected
residuals is described
Rd(Pr; s, τ f ) =

∑n
j=1 B j′
−1(Pr − s) if Pr − s ≥ −τ f
[ ˆR(τ f ),∞) if Pr − s = −τ f ,
(50)
where we define ˆR(τ f ) ≡ ∑nj=1 rˆ j(τ f ). This demand curve is described in Figure 10.
Rs(Pr; τh), Pr(Rs; τh)
0 R
Pr
Rd(Pr; s, τ f )
Rd(Pr; s)
s − τ f
RRc
ˆR(τ f )
Pr( ˆR(τ f ), τh)
Figure 10:
Next, noting that the equilibrium outcomes are defined just by replacing the demand
curve of recycling in Section 2 with the demand curve induced above, we will alter the
policy instruments. Suppose that Z∗f (¯t, s¯; τ¯ f , τ¯h) = ¯Z f > 0. We depict the starting state of
each case in Figure 10. In this case, the following must be satisfied: Pr( ˆR(τ¯ f ); τ¯h) < s¯− τ¯ f
and Rc = ˆR(τ¯ f ). Reset s = s¯− {(s¯− τ¯ f )− Pr( ˆR(τ¯ f ); τ¯h)}. The downward arrow in the figure
represents this policy alteration. Then, s − τ¯ f = Pr( ˆR(τ¯ f ); τ¯h). Therefore, Z∗f = 0 and still,
Rc = ˆR(τ¯ f ). So, ∆R = ¯Z f , where R ≡ ∑nj=1 rdj and ∆ represent the difference between the
starting state and the state after the alteration of the policy. Since s does not affect the
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supply and demand of products, ∆R = ∆Zh. Because the monitoring level is unchanged,
the monitoring cost is constant. Thus, ∆W = Cr( ¯Z f + ˆR(τ¯ f )) −Cr( ˆR(τ¯ f )) > 0. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1
Proof. Suppose that the policy set (t, s; τh) = (¯t, s¯; τ¯h) is optimal (the solution of prob-
lem (39)), but τ¯h > 0. Note that we have τ f = τ∗f (s¯; τ¯h) according to the optimal mon-
itoring rule. Then, the equilibrium outcomes under this policy set are (X,R,Zh,Z f ) =
(X∗(¯t; τ¯h),R∗(s¯; τ¯h), X∗(¯t; τ¯h) − R∗(s¯; τ¯h), 0).
Consider the case where the authorities reset the policy (t, s; τh) = (¯t+τ¯h, s¯+τ¯h; 0) under
the optimal monitoring rule τ f = τ∗f (s¯+ τ¯h; 0). Then, the equilibrium outcomes in this case
are exactly the same as those before the resetting. This is because X∗(¯t; τ¯h) = X∗(¯t + τ¯h; 0)
by (28), R∗(s¯; τ¯h) = R∗(s¯ + τ¯h; 0) by (31), and Z∗h = X∗ −R∗ by Z∗f = 0 owing to the optimal
monitoring rule. Furthermore, since ∂(s − P∗r)/∂s = ∂(s − P∗r)/∂τh by (29) and (30), we
must have τ∗f (s¯; τ¯h) = τ∗f (s¯ + τ¯h; 0) by the definition of the optimal monitoring rule.
Since only the monitoring cost for households is changed and other things are constant
after the alteration of the policy set, W∗(¯t + τ¯h, s¯ + τ¯h; 0) − W∗(¯t, s¯; τ¯h) = Γh(τ¯h) − Γh(0).
Since Γh(τ¯h) > Γh(0) by τ¯h > 0, the monitoring cost for households is saved by the policy
resetting. This improves the equilibrium welfare — a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4
Proof. First, we will show that sˆ > 0 which satisfies sˆ = Pr(sˆ) exists. By (18), ∀s,
Rd(s; s) = ∑ j B′−1j (0) = Rd(0; 0) > 0, where the existence of B′−1j (0) > 0 comes from the
assumptions that B′j(0) > 0 and that limr→∞ B′j(r) = −∞. Set s = Pr(Rd(0, 0)) > 0. Then,
P∗r(s) = s since the recycling demand Rd(Pr; s) and the recycling supply Pr(Rs) intersect
at (Rd(0, 0), Pr(Rd(0, 0))). Thus, we obtain sˆ = Pr(Rd(0, 0)).
Next, ascertain the fact that s − P∗r(s) is strictly increasing in s. When R∗(s) > 0, from
(29),
∂s − P∗r
∂s
=
∑m
i=1(1/Cri′′)∑m
i=1(1/Cri′′) −
∑n
j=1(1/B j′′)
> 0.
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Since sˆ − P∗r(sˆ) = 0, the uniqueness of sˆ and claim that s Q P∗r(s) if and only if s Q sˆ
immediately follows from this fact. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2
Proof. Plug the first-order conditions for products markets into (40) and solve the equation
with respect to t. Then, we obtain t = d.
The next step is to induce the optimal subsidy with monitoring. Suppose that s > sˆ;
then, the authorities need to implement some monitoring for firms. Plug into the first-order
conditions for the recycling market into (41) and solve the equation with respect to s using
(29) and (31). Then, we obtain the requested result. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3
Proof. Since the first order condition with respect to t is (40), we can find that the optimal
tax is still tN = d by exactly the same way as is the case in the proof of Proposition 2.
The next step is to induce the optimal subsidy without monitoring. Note that the
interior solution, R∗(s) > 0, is assumed. By substituting the households’ and firms’
first-order conditions for the recycling market, we rewrite the left hand side of (42) as
[P∗r(s)− s−P∗r(s) + d]∂R∗/∂s = (d− s)∂R∗/∂s. Thus, by (31), the first-order condition (42)
is reduced as
d − s ≥ 0, with equality if s < sˆ. (51)
(i) Consider the case d ≥ sˆ. If s < sˆ, we must have d < sˆ since s = d by (51). This
cannot occur in this case. Meanwhile, s = sˆ satisfies (51) since d ≥ sˆ.
(ii) Consider the case d < sˆ. If s = sˆ, we must have sˆ ≤ d since s ≤ d by (51). This
cannot occur in this case. Meanwhile, s = d satisfies (51) since d < sˆ. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4
Proof. Observe that since each equilibrium outcome is continuous in s by the maximum
theorem and τ∗f (s) is also continuous in s by its definition and Lemma 4, W∗ is, in particu-
lar, at s = sˆ, continuous in s.
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Suppose that sM > sˆ, that is, d > sˆ + A(sM), where sM is defined in Proposition 2.
In this case, since d > sˆ, the optimal policy without monitoring sN is sˆ, which is defined
in Proposition 3. Since we suppose that the second-order condition is globally met when
s > sˆ, W∗(tM, sM) −W∗(tN , sN) = W∗(d, sM) −W∗(d, sˆ) > 0 if sM > sˆ by the continuity of
W∗ at sˆ.
Otherwise, there arises the case where sM ≤ sˆ or the case where sM does not exist,
W∗(d, s) − W∗(d, sˆ) < 0 for all s > sˆ. This is because if there exists s¯ > sˆ such that
W∗(d, s¯) − W∗(d, sˆ) > 0, W∗(d, s) is increasing in s when s ≥ s¯ since sM, which satisfies
∂W∗/∂s = 0, does not exist in the region where s > sˆ — this contradicts the existence
of the optimal policy with positive direct disposal. Therefore, the optimal policy without
monitoring is the global optimal policy by the continuity of W∗ at sˆ. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5
Proof. Under the policy with a take-back requirement in the statement, suppose that PT =
¯PT . By setting t = α ¯PT and s = ¯PT , we can replicate the same outcome in the D-R
policy. From Lemma 2 and Proposition 1, the optimal D-R policy is superior to this
policy. Q.E.D.
Lemma 6
Proof. Fix (α,ZT ). Then, the left-hand side of (48) is strictly decreasing in PT since
∂[αX∗(αPT ) − R∗(PT )]
∂PT
= α2
∂X∗(αPT )
∂(αPT ) −
∂R∗(PT )
∂PT
=
∑n
j=1(1/Cx j′′)
∑m
i=1(1/Ui′′)∑n
j=1(1/Cx j′′) −
∑m
i=1(1/Ui′′)
− −
∑m
i=1(1/Cri′′)
∑n
j=1(1/B j′′)∑m
i=1(1/Cri′′) −
∑n
j=1(1/B j′′)
< 0
where the third expression is obtained from (28) and (31). Therefore, for given (α, ZT ), PT
and thus αPT must be uniquely determined by (48). Conversely, fix (αPT , PT ). Obviously,
α is uniquely determined by α = αPT/PT . Then, ZT must also be uniquely determined by
(48) since for given (α, PT ), the left-hand side of (48) is strictly decreasing in PT . Q.E.D.
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